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Articles
Misleading conduct by multiple parties and
proportionate liability
Joachim Dietrich*
The application and interpretation of proportionate liability rules continues to
create uncertainty. Those rules have been introduced in all Australian states
and territories, as well as under Commonwealth jurisdiction. This article
focuses on one specific issue that has troubled courts. How does
proportionate liability apply where a plaintiff brings an action for loss caused
by misleading conduct engaged in by multiple defendants? Not
uncommonly, multiple parties might be responsible for, or participate in,
misleading conduct that contravenes s 18 of the ACL (or equivalent sections)
in a variety of ways. This article considers the difficult legal questions that
arise in such scenarios, a number of which questions remain unresolved.
The answers to those questions may depend on the jurisdiction in which
those questions arise, since there are critical differences in law between the
different jurisdictions. This article concludes that where defendants are
jointly liable for the same conduct, other than vicariously so, proportionate
liability applies, at least in most jurisdictions, and despite some decisions to
the contrary.
Introduction
The proportionate liability rules introduced in all Australian states and
territories, as well as under Commonwealth jurisdiction, have been widely
criticised from their inception.1 Proportionate liability potentially applies
where a plaintiff has suffered economic loss or property damage that results
either from (1) misleading or deceptive conduct that contravenes s 18 of the
Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’) or equivalent provisions (under
Commonwealth and State and Territory legislation) or (2) from ‘a failure to
take reasonable care’.2 If proportionate liability applies, it displaces the joint
* Faculty of Law, Bond University, Queensland. My thanks go to Dr Iain Field for his helpful
comments on an earlier draft and to the referee for helpful corrections; remaining errors are
my own.
1 See nn 3–5 below. For a more general criticism of the supposed ethical and pragmatic
arguments in favour of proportionate liability, see Kit Barker and Jenny Steele, ‘Drifting
Towards Proportionate Liability: Ethics and Pragmatics’ (2015) 71 Cambridge Law Journal
49.
2 State and Territory: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 107B; Civil Liability Act 2002
(NSW) pt 4; Proportionate Liability Act 2005 (NT) s 4; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 28;
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability Act 2001 (SA) s 3;
Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 43A; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 24AF; Civil Liability Act 2002
(WA) s 5AI. The Queensland legislation uses the phrase ‘arising from a breach of a duty of
care’, but that phrase is defined as a duty to take reasonable care or exercise reasonable skill
(sch 2) and hence there is probably no substantive difference. Under the civil liability
statutes (as they will be generically described), proportionate liability applies to claims for
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and several liabilities of defendants for all of the plaintiff’s losses caused by
their wrong and instead makes defendants liable only for their apportioned
share of the loss.
Many commentators predicted the potential problems that were likely to
arise from the complex and difficult drafting of the proportionate liability
provisions, the lack of uniformity in drafting between the various
jurisdictions, and the potential for ‘erratic’ results,3 among other things.4
These predictions have proved to be largely prescient, even if some of the
potential problems identified by commentators5 and problems flowing from
early decisions are being resolved. For example, one fear — that losses arising
from breaches of strict contractual duties6 or trust could be subject to
apportionment if a defendant could show that failure to take care was the
underlying cause — has now been laid to rest.7 Another concern raised by
commentators, that proportionate liability might impact negatively on
plaintiffs, is now less likely to eventuate because of the capacity for plaintiffs
to frame their claims tactically in order to avoid apportionment (on which
more below).8 This article does not intend to revisit all of the concerns raised
by others.9 Rather, it highlights one key problem that arises in the context of
misleading conduct.
The question addressed is this. How does proportionate liability apply
where a plaintiff brings an action for loss caused by misleading conduct
engaged in by multiple defendants? Not uncommonly, multiple parties might
be responsible for, or participate in, misleading conduct in the context of
negotiations and transactions in a variety of ways, thereby contravening s 18
losses resulting from misleading conduct contravening s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law
(‘ACL’) where state or territory jurisdiction is engaged. Proportionate liability also applies
to losses resulting from misleading conduct that contravenes s 18 and other legislation where
Commonwealth jurisdiction applies. See pt VIA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010
(Cth) (‘Consumer Act’) (ACL s 18 contraventions); pt 7.10 div 2A of the Corporations Act
2001 (Cth) (misleading conduct contravening s 1041H); and pt 2 div 2 sub-div GA of the
Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (‘ASIC Act’) (misleading
conduct in trade or commerce for financial services contravening s 12DA).
3 Barbara McDonald, ‘Proportionate Liability in Australia: The devil in the detail’ (2005) 26
Australian Bar Review 29, 49.
4 See, eg, James Watson, ‘From contribution to apportioned contribution to proportionate
liability’ (2004) 78 Australian Law Journal 126; Wayne Courtney, ‘Problems with the New
Regime of Proportionate Liability for Misleading or Deceptive Conduct’ (2005) 32
University of Western Australia Law Review 164. As to whether proportionate liability could
apply to equitable claims, see Vicki Jeannette Vann, ‘Equity and proportionate liability’
(2007) 1 Journal of Equity 199, suggesting a number of circumstances in which equitable
liability might be caught by the legislation, though since that article, it does not appear that
there have been any successful attempts to circumvent joint and several liability. See, eg,
George v Webb [2011] NSWSC 1608 (20 December 2011).
5 See, eg, Barbara McDonald and John Carter, ‘The Lottery of Contractual Risk Allocation
and Proportionate Liability’ (2009) 26 Journal of Contract Law 1.
6 See ibid.
7 See, eg, George v Webb [2011] NSWSC 1608 (20 December 2011) (payment out of funds
in breach of trust not apportionable claim: see [306]–[325]).
8 The High Court gave its stamp of approval to such strategies in Selig v Wealthsure Pty Ltd
(2015) 255 CLR 661 (‘Selig’).
9 See also Sandip Mukerjea, ‘Proportionate liability for economic loss: The story so far’
(2008) 19 Insurance Law Journal 279, for discussion of some of the other matters where
interpretation issues are being clarified.
158 (2016) 24 Competition & Consumer Law Journal
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 9 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Wed May 10 21:08:23 2017
/journals/journal/cclj/vol24pt3/part_3
of the ACL (or equivalent sections). Several parties, perhaps acting in different
capacities, may have all made the same misrepresentations; or they may have
made different misrepresentations on which the plaintiff relied; or they may be
vicariously liable or otherwise responsible for the misleading conduct of
another; or they may be accessories to it. This article considers the difficult
legal questions that arise in such scenarios, a number of which legal questions
remain unresolved and will continue to trouble the courts in many cases. The
answers to those questions may depend on the jurisdiction in which those
questions arise, since there are critical differences in law between
jurisdictions.
I will set the scene for the discussion by considering a number of fact
scenarios and how the proportionate liability provisions are being applied to
them, including outstanding issues that the law needs to resolve. In each of
these scenarios, the plaintiff, P, relies on the misrepresentation(s) made by the
defendant, D, and suffers loss as a result. P sues D, for misleading conduct in
trade or commerce, and D pleads that a concurrent wrongdoer also caused P’s
loss, such that D is only proportionately responsible for part of the loss.10 For
convenience, I use the term misrepresentation as a shorthand for misleading
conduct.
Scenario 1 Vicarious liability
A defendant, D, is vicariously liable for a misrepresentation made by its
employee or agent, E. There is therefore only one act for which D and E are
jointly responsible. Are D and E ‘concurrent wrongdoers’? If so, is D
precluded from raising proportionate liability because of specific sections in
the legislative regimes?
Scenario 2 Joint wrongdoers for same act
D makes a misrepresentation and an accessory, A, is involved in the making
of that misrepresentation and is therefore jointly liable for the same
contravention as D. The same issue arises where D and D2 engage in joint
conduct (for example, authorising an advertisement) that is misleading. Can D
raise the proportionate liability provisions where there is only one act for
which D, and either A or D2, are jointly liable?
Scenario 3 Independent wrongdoers for distinct acts
D makes a misrepresentation; D2 makes a distinct, different
misrepresentation. P relies on both misrepresentations to enter into a
loss-making transaction. Can D plead that D2 is a concurrent wrongdoer so
that proportionate liability applies?11 The answer to this question would
appear to be clearly, yes, but the answer may be to the contrary in
Queensland.12
Before turning to the legal questions that these scenarios raise, however, it
10 It is assumed that P is not a ‘consumer’ for the purposes of these scenarios. If she were, then
a defendant would not be successful in seeking proportionate liability in Queensland and
ACT jurisdiction.
11 Would it make a difference if D2 is also an agent or employee of D, for whose wrongs D is
vicariously liable?
12 See s 32F of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), discussed below.
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is necessary to outline the legislative regimes and define certain key concepts.
Brief overview of proportionate liability
Where statutory proportionate liability applies, liability is apportioned to each
‘concurrent wrongdoer’ according to the extent of their responsibility for the
harm. Each wrongdoer is then responsible to that extent and no more.13
Consequently, it is necessary for a plaintiff to sue all of the wrongdoers in
order to recover the full loss. The broad purpose and impact of proportionate
liability is explained by the High Court in Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell
Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd14 by reference to the NSW provisions:
Part 4 of the Civil Liability Act represents a departure from the regime of liability for
negligence at common law (solidary liability), where liability may be joint or several
but each wrongdoer can be treated as the effective cause and therefore bear the
whole loss. Under that regime, a plaintiff can sue and recover his or her loss from
one wrongdoer, leaving that wrongdoer to seek contribution from other wrongdoers.
The risk that any of the other wrongdoers will be insolvent or otherwise unable to
meet a claim for contribution lies with the defendant sued. By comparison, under a
regime of proportionate liability, liability is apportioned to each wrongdoer
according to the Court’s assessment of the extent of their responsibility. It is
therefore necessary that the plaintiff sue all of the wrongdoers in order to recover the
total loss and, of course, the risk that one of them may be insolvent shifts to the
plaintiff.15
As the High Court observed in Selig v Wealthsure Pty Ltd,16 ‘[t]here is an
obvious benefit to wrongdoers from this kind of proportionate liability
regime.’ How this ‘obvious benefit’ came about,17 and whether the purported
rationales for proportionate liability are, indeed, fair and justifiable,18 is not
the concern of this article. Rather, this article is concerned with the operation
of the regime and what defendants must prove in order to obtain the benefit
of them.
A defendant who seeks to reduce his or her liability by resort to
proportionate liability must establish two key requirements: (1) that the claim
13 The relevant provisions are as follows: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt VIA
and equivalents in the Corporation Act and ASIC Act; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT)
ch 7A; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 4; Proportionate Liability Act 2005 (NT); Civil
Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 2 pt 2; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and
Apportionment of Liability Act 2001 (SA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) pt 9A; Wrongs Act
1958 (Vic) pt IVAA; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 1F.
14 (2013) 247 CLR 613 (‘Hunt & Hunt’).
15 Ibid 624 [10] (French CJ, Hayne and Kiefel JJ) footnote omitted.
16 (2015) 255 CLR 661, 671–2 [21] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ; Gageler J
concurring).
17 It suffices to say that the Davis Report was one clear impetus for the changes. See the report
by Professor Jim Davis: Commonwealth, Inquiry into the Law of Joint and Several Liability:
Report of Stage Two (1995) (‘Davis Report’). As the High Court noted, despite the 7-year
gap between that report and the NSW Civil Liability Act 2002 proportionate liability
provisions, ‘there is a clear connection between’ the two, since the NSW Act reflected draft
model provisions themselves reflecting the Davis Report, and prepared by the Standing
Committee of Attorneys-General in 1996. See Hunt & Hunt (2013) 247 CLR 656, 626 [15].
18 I do, however, share the doubts expressed by Barker and Steele, above n 1.
160 (2016) 24 Competition & Consumer Law Journal
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for which the defendant is liable is an ‘apportionable claim’19 and, (2) that
there are one or more ‘concurrent wrongdoers’ whose conduct caused the ‘loss
or damage’ that is the subject of the plaintiff’s claim.
‘Apportionable claim’
Under Commonwealth jurisdiction, an ‘apportionable claim’ is defined in
s 87CB of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (‘Consumer Act’) as
follows:
(1) This Part applies to a claim (an apportionable claim ) if the claim is a claim
for damages made under section 236 of the Australian Consumer Law for:
(a) economic loss; or
(b) damage to property;
caused by conduct that was done in a contravention of section 18 of the
Australian Consumer Law.
Under state and territory civil liability statutes, claims for damages under the
relevant state acts that give effect to the ACL,20 for contravention of s 18 of
the ACL, are also included within the definition of ‘apportionable claim’.
However, a wider range of claims are caught by these provisions, since they
extend to any claims for economic loss or property damage that arises from ‘a
failure to take reasonable care’.21 It should be noted that in Queensland and
the ACT, claims for contravention of ACL s 18 are not apportionable if the
plaintiff comes within the definition of a ‘consumer’.22 As a consequence of
this, if a defendant engages in misleading conduct towards a consumer in
those jurisdictions, and the plaintiff’s claim can only be brought under the
respective Fair Trading Acts, then the defendant would not be able to rely on
apportionment, whereas if Commonwealth jurisdiction applies under the
Consumer Act, then a defendant could reduce its liability.
Importantly, apportionable claims are limited (claims in negligence aside)
to contraventions of s 18 of the ACL and identical provisions in other acts.
This places a significant limitation on the availability of apportionment to
defendants. This is because claims brought under more specific prohibitions in
the ACL (and equivalent legislative protections) are not apportionable. This
includes claims made under s 29 (specific false or misleading
misrepresentations in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods
or services) or s 30 (specific false or misleading misrepresentations in
connection with the sale of land).23 The legislation requires that
19 Although the legislation uses the term ‘claim’, it is clear that a claim must be one that gives
rise to legal liability against the respective parties against whom claims may be made.
20 See Fair Trading (Australian Consumer Law) Act 1992 (ACT); Fair Trading Act 1987
(NSW); Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act (NT); Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld); Fair
Trading Act 1987 (SA); Australian Consumer Law (Tasmania) Act 2010 (Tas); Australian
Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 (Vic); Fair Trading Act 2010 (WA).
21 See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 107B; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 4;
Proportionate Liability Act 2005 (NT) s 4; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 28; Law Reform
(Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability Act 2001 (SA) s 3; Civil Liability
Act 2002 (Tas) s 43A; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 24AF; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5AI.
22 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 107B; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 28.
23 See obiter comments of Emmett JA (Bathurst CJ and McColl JA concurring) in Williams v
Pisano (2015) 90 NSWLR 342, 353–5 [55]–[64] (‘Williams’).
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non-apportionable claims are dealt with by reference to general law
principles.24 In other words, the defendant will be jointly and severally liable
for the full extent of a plaintiff’s losses arising from the non-apportionable
claim. That positon was affirmed by the High Court in Selig,25 clarifying the
position after some inconsistent lower court decisions.26
In Selig, the plaintiffs made generic misleading conduct claims under the
equivalents to s 18 of the ACL found in the Corporations Act and ASIC Act.27
Alongside those claims, the plaintiffs also pleaded a number of more specific
infringements of those acts.28 The loss that was suffered as a result of all of the
various breaches was the same.29 The Full Court of the Federal Court held that
all the claims were one apportionable claim.30 Section 1041L(2) of the
Corporations Act, equating with 87CB(2) of the Consumer Act, states that:
(2) For the purposes of this Part, there is a single apportionable claim in
proceedings in respect of the same loss or damage even if the claim for the
loss or damage is based on more than one cause of action (whether or not of
the same or a different kind).
According to the Federal Court, the consequence of this subsection was that
there was a single apportionable claim, since one of the causes of action was
a generic misleading conduct claim (defined as apportionable under sub-s (1)).
The High Court rejected this interpretation of sub-s (2), it being inconsistent
with the clear wording of s 1041L sub-s (1) of the Corporations Act. Like
s 87CB(1) of the Consumer Act quoted above, that subsection confines an
24 See s 87CD(2) Consumer Act (the High Court considering the equivalent, s 1041N(2) of the
Corporations Act) which states:
If the proceedings involve both an apportionable claim and a claim that is not an
apportionable claim:
(a) liability for the apportionable claim is to be determined in accordance with the
provisions of this Part; and
(b) liability for the other claim is to be determined in accordance with the legal
rules, if any, that (apart from this Part) are relevant.
25 Selig v Wealthsure Pty Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 261.
26 See, eg, Wealthsure Pty Ltd v Selig (2014) 221 FCR 1 (Mansfield and Besanko JJ; White J
dissenting), overturned on appeal by the High Court, and the different conclusion reached by
a unanimous Full Federal Court in ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council
(2014) 224 FCR 1 (prior to but consistently with the High Court’s appeal decision). For
commentary on the position prior to Selig, see Richard Douglas, Gerard Mullins and Simon
Grant, Annotated Civil Liability Legislation — Queensland (LexisNexis Butterworths,
3rd ed, 2012) [28.19]–[28.21].
27 Namely Corporations Act s 1041H and ASIC Act s 12DA.
28 The plaintiffs’ claims, alongside their misleading conduct claims, included contraventions of
the Corporations Act 2001 provisions requiring a provider of financial advice to have a
reasonable basis for the advice provided; breaches of statutory warranties that services will
be rendered with due care and skill, contrary to s 12ED of the ASIC Act; false representations
regarding the standard of financial services (contrary to s 12DB of the ASIC Act) and
concerning financial products (contrary to s 1041E of the Corporations Act). See Wealthsure
Pty Ltd v Selig (2014) 221 FCR 1, 27 [125].
29 Selig (2015) 255 CLR 661, 672 [22].
30 Proportionate liability provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) are found in pt 7.10
div 2 of the Act.
162 (2016) 24 Competition & Consumer Law Journal
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‘apportionable claim’ to economic loss and property damage ‘caused by
conduct that was done in contravention of’ s 1041H of the Corporations Act
(s 18 of the ACL).31
As a result of Selig, there is therefore a considerable tactical advantage for
a party who has relied on misleading conduct in pleading more specific
contraventions of the ACL (or indeed to plead another claim altogether), even
if alongside s 18. Those more specific claims, if made out, will not be
apportioned.32
‘Concurrent wrongdoer’
The second important requirement for the application of proportionate liability
is the need to establish that one or more concurrent wrongdoers exist. Here we
find a critical difference in the definition that is adopted in the various
jurisdictions. In all jurisdictions, other than Queensland and South Australia,
the definition is as follows:
a concurrent wrongdoer, in relation to a claim, is a person who is one of 2 or more
persons whose acts or omissions (or act or omission) caused, independently of each
other or jointly, the damage or loss that is the subject of the claim.33
Critically, in Queensland and South Australia, the words ‘or jointly’ are
missing from this definition.34 That difference is likely to have a significant
impact on claims brought against multiple parties to misrepresentations in the
course of negotiations. The interpretation of this section, and its variation in
Queensland and South Australia, is discussed further below.
A number of other issues need to be noted first, however. One limitation on
proportionate liability is that if a concurrent wrongdoer intended to cause, or
31 In support of that conclusion, the High Court noted that the specific contraventions of the
Corporations Act and ASIC Act that the plaintiffs also relied on constituted offences and
involved a higher level of moral culpability than mere ordinary misleading conduct. See
(2015) 255 CLR 661, 675 [36]. (A similar point was made by Emmett JA in Williams (2015)
90 NSWLR 342, 354–5 [62]–[63] with reference to a claim for contravention of s 30, versus
s 18, of the ACL.) Gageler J reached the same conclusion for similar reasons. Gageler J
stressed that the effect of s 1041L(1), (4) is that only claims specified in sub-s (1) can be
aggregated into a single apportionable claim under s 1041(2); claim ‘cannot be read as
referring simply to the economic loss or property damage for which a claimant seeks to
recover [55]’. Consequently,
[a]ny assertion made by the same claimant that liability for the same economic loss or
property damage has arisen by reason of the same conduct breaching some other
statutory norm, ... does not form part of the same ‘claim’ even if it is made in the same
proceeding: at [57].
32 Tactical pleading can also be used to avoid other undesirable consequences, as is
demonstrated by Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Milanex Pty Ltd (in liq) [2011] NSWCA 367
(28 November 2011) in which the NSW Court of Appeal held that a contributory negligence
defence did not apply where the plaintiff sued under state misleading conduct legislation that
at the time did not include such a defence, despite Commonwealth legislation including such
a defence.
33 See s 87CB(3) of the Consumer Act; and similarly, see Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT)
s 107D; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 34; Proportionate Liability Act 2005 (NT) s 6;
Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 43A; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 24AH; Civil Liability Act 2002
(WA) s 5AI.
34 See Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 30; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and
Apportionment of Liability Act 2001 (SA) s 3.
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fraudulently caused, the loss, that wrongdoer is fully liable for it.35 This would
include a defendant who is sued in negligence or for misleading conduct, but
against whom the plaintiff can establish such intention or fraud. There is some
uncertainty as to what is meant by ‘intention’ and ‘fraud’ — for example, does
the latter include equitable fraud36 — but these difficulties are not the concern
of this article.
Another difficulty that has troubled courts is how broadly or narrowly
damage (or loss) and causation of that loss, are to be interpreted. For example,
is the loss caused by fraudsters in forging documents to obtain money, the
same loss as is caused by solicitors who fail to ensure adequate security for a
loan? That issue has now been resolved, at least in part, by the High Court. In
Hunt & Hunt,37 the High Court by a bare majority (French CJ, Hayne and
Kiefel JJ) took a broad approach to characterising damage and causation of
damage. In brief, the case concerned a loss to a plaintiff lender caused by the
negligence of the defendant solicitors who had failed to adequately safeguard
a security transaction. The majority held that that loss was the same loss as
that which was caused by fraudsters (and therefore the concurrent
wrongdoers) who had induced the lender to advance the moneys on forged
loan documents. That loss was the inability to recover money that the plaintiff
had paid out. The majority held that the fraudsters’ actions did not have to
contribute to the negligent breach of duty by the solicitors. Instead, the
relevant issue was whether the actions of each concurrent wrongdoer
‘separately, materially contributed to the loss or damage suffered’.38 The case
is a difficult one, and there are good arguments in favour of both the majority
and minority views,39 but the issue is not of relevance to the focus of this
article and will not be further discussed.
Having set the context, it is now appropriate to focus on the central question
addressed in this article. How does proportionate liability apply, and in which
circumstances, where a number of parties are responsible for misleading
conduct? That question in turn is answered in part by reference to the meaning
35 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 87CC; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT)
s 107E; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 34A; Proportionate Liability Act 2005 (NT) s 7;
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ss 32D, 32F; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and
Apportionment of Liability Act 2001 (SA) s 4; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 43A; Wrongs
Act 1958 (Vic) s 24AM; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5AJA.
36 See Vann, above n 4.
37 Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 613, 626 [15].
38 Ibid 636–7 [53].
39 Bell and Gageler JJ in dissent reasoned that characterising the loss in broad terms, as an
inability to recover money paid out — which loss, according to the majority, was caused by
both the fraudsters’ fraud and the solicitors’ negligence — was to undermine the duty of the
solicitors to protect the lenders against risks. The solicitors’ negligence caused the lender to
lack security, and nothing that the fraudsters did caused that lack of security: ibid 652 [100].
Hence, the fraudsters were not concurrent wrongdoers: ibid 652 [101]. More generally, the
dissent noted that the majority approach went beyond that which the Davis Report, above
n 17, explained as the intended purpose of the reforms, namely to transfer the risk of another
wrongdoer’s impecuniousness or insolvency. They state ‘It would be transferring to A [the
plaintiff] some or all of the very risk against which it was the duty of B [the solicitors] to
protect A. It would be altering rights and duties to an extent not necessary to achieve the
identified statutory purpose. It would be doing so in a manner not compelled by the statutory
language’: at [95].
164 (2016) 24 Competition & Consumer Law Journal
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of concurrent wrongdoer and whether that concept includes joint
wrongdoers.40 In particular, one critical question on which the courts have
reached contradictory conclusions is whether defendants who are jointly
responsible for a single act are concurrent wrongdoers. Scenarios 1 and 2
directly raise this issue. In addressing this issue, and others, it is necessary to
consider the reasoning in a number of the key cases.
The first case is Tomasetti v Brailey from New South Wales.41 The case
concerned the liability of an agent who, on behalf of a company, engaged in
misleading conduct in contravention of s 42 of the Fair Trading Act 1987
(NSW). The NSW Court of Appeal accepted that the company was jointly
liable with the agent, irrespective of whether the basis of the company’s
liability was vicarious, or direct by also treating the agent’s conduct as that of
the company itself.42 Nonetheless, the Court went on to state, with almost no
analysis, that both parties were liable for 100 per cent of the loss and could not
avail themselves of the proportionate liability defence. The Court stated that
the parties ‘were each fully responsible for the losses and it is just that each
be liable for 100 per cent of the losses’.43 Interestingly, no reliance seems to
have been placed on s 39 of the Fair Trading Act, which deals with vicariously
liable parties (and is discussed below).44
Tomasetti was followed in a Queensland decision, Hadgelias Holdings Pty
Ltd v Seirlis,45 and similar reasoning was adopted. The Court applied the
proportionate liability provisions under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)
(‘TPA’) ss 87CB, 87CD, but these are in the same terms as the current
ss 87CB, 87CD of the Consumer Act. The relationships of the various multiple
defendants were complex. Hadgelias Holdings Pty Ltd, and an independent
contractor engaged by them, Mr Waight, acted as agents to sell an apartment
for five vendors of property. One of the vendors was a company. The agents
made misleading representations on behalf of the vendors. Those
representations were deemed by statute to be those of the vendors.46
Mr Waight also made a further, distinct misrepresentation which he was not
authorised to make, and which was therefore not conduct for which the
vendors (or his employer) were responsible.47 Were the various defendants
concurrent wrongdoers? It is worthwhile setting out the relevant definition
again from Consumer Act s 87CB(3):
a concurrent wrongdoer, in relation to a claim, is a person who is one of 2 or more
persons whose acts or omissions (or act or omission) caused, independently of each
other or jointly, the damage or loss that is the subject of the claim.
40 The application of other specific provisions is also relevant.
41 (2012) 274 FLR 248 (‘Tomasetti’).
42 Ibid [152].
43 Ibid [154].
44 A passing and cryptic reference was made to that section: ibid [156].
45 [2015] 1 Qd R 337 (‘Hadgelias’). Tomasetti was also followed in Hobbs Haulage Pty Ltd v
Zupps Southside Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 319 (18 November 2013) (‘Hobbs’), discussed below.
46 Hadgelias [2015] 1 Qd R 337, 338 [1] (Holmes JA; Gotterson and Morrison JJA agreeing).
This was pursuant to s 84 of the TPA; see Seirlis v Bengston [2013] QSC 240 (11 September
2013) [94]–[103], [117].
47 Hadgelias [2015] 1 Qd R 337, 341 [12], 342 [17].
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The Court of Appeal held that the definition of concurrent wrongdoers did not
extend to situations where the relevant parties were all responsible for a single
act and therefore Hadgelias, Waight and the vendors could not take advantage
of proportionate liability in relation to the misleading conduct.48 On a first
reading, this conclusion might appear counterintuitive, give the presence of
the words ‘or jointly’ in the definition of a concurrent wrongdoer. In a very
brief analysis, however, the Court interpreted the words ‘or jointly’ as
qualifying the word ‘caused’, rather than describing the acts or omissions (or
act or omission).49 Consequently, Holmes JA concluded:
I would construe the definition in s 87CB as concerned with distinct acts (or
omissions) or sets of acts (or omissions) by different actors, combining or working
independently to cause loss or damage, and consequently inapplicable where there
is but a single act or set of acts causing loss, attributable to more than one person.50
This interpretation is problematic. If the word ‘jointly’ qualifies the word
‘caused’, then a distinction must be drawn between joint and independent
causes of a loss, and that, surely, can only meaningfully be done by
distinguishing between joint or independent conduct. It is difficult to see how
joint wrongdoers’ conduct might, conceivably, cause loss ‘independently’,
since joint wrongdoers are those who are jointly responsible for a single act
(or omission).51
In relation to Mr Waight, since his misleading conduct was a distinct act, he
was a concurrent wrongdoer with the other parties, but was nonetheless unable
to rely on apportionment and was separately responsible for the whole loss.
This was because of a specific provision, s 32F of the Civil Liability Act 2003
(Qld). This provision is unique to Queensland, and is considered further
below.
It must be stressed, however, that although the Court’s conclusion on the
meaning of concurrent wrongdoer is challenged below, the outcome of the
case is justifiable. The Court at no time considered the provisions in the TPA
(now the Consumer Act) that exclude from proportionate liability a vicariously
liable party. On that basis alone, the Court could have supported its decision
with respect to some of the parties.52
Similar issues arose in the NSW Court of Appeal case of in Williams
v Pisano.53 In that case, two vendors sold their house to the plaintiffs. The
vendors jointly made representations concerning the quality of renovation
48 Although the non-corporate vendors were not caught by the TPA directly, they were
nonetheless liable as accessories to the agents’ misleading conduct. See Seirlis v Bengston
[2013] QSC 240 (11 September 2013) [94]–[103].
49 [2015] 1 Qd R 337, 343 [20].
50 Ibid 343 [21].
51 And two independent wrongdoers’ acts can only, one would assume, ‘independently’ rather
than ‘jointly’ cause a loss.
52 Admittedly, this basis would not excuse the vendors who were accessories to the agents’
wrong. Nonetheless, there was a further basis for the decision that the Court did not,
however, consider to be available. The Court stated that if the claim was an apportionable
claim, the fact that the purchasers had also made out a specific contravention of TPA s 53A
(now ACL s 30: misleading conduct relating to the sale of land) alongside TPA s 52 (ACL
s 18), this did not prevent the claim being apportionable (see at [25]). That conclusion is now
incorrect in light of Selig (2015) 255 CLR 661, discussed above.
53 (2015) 90 NSWLR 342.
166 (2016) 24 Competition & Consumer Law Journal
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 17 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Wed May 10 21:08:23 2017
/journals/journal/cclj/vol24pt3/part_3
work, which were repeated by their agent to the purchasers with the authority
of both defendant vendors. Those representations were misleading conduct
under both ss 18, 30 of the ACL. The plaintiffs sued the vendors,54 but failed
in the NSW Court of Appeal because the defendants’ conduct was not in trade
or commerce. Nonetheless, Emmett JA in obiter comments considered the
argument raised by the defendant vendors that the claim against them was
apportionable, and that each should therefore only be liable for a percentage
of the total loss (should they have been held liable).55 On that matter, the key
question addressed by Emmett JA was:
whether s 87CB(3) [of the Consumer Act defining ‘concurrent wrongdoer’] applies
to a situation where a single act that causes damage that is the subject of a claim
under the Consumer Act is committed by two or more persons jointly.56
Since both defendant vendors had (jointly)57 been responsible for the
misleading conduct of the agent, could it be said that that single act had been
carried out by ‘concurrent wrongdoers’?
In Emmett JA’s view, the definition of ‘concurrent wrongdoer’ was not free
from difficulty, but taking the definition as a whole, the answer to the above
question led to a contrary conclusion to that which was reached in Tomasetti58
and Hadgelias.59 In his Honour’s view, the existence of the words ‘acts or
omissions (or act or omission)’, as well as ‘or jointly’, appear to make it clear
that joint wrongdoers are encompassed by the language of the section. In
short, the singular ‘act or omission’ could apply equally to ‘2 or more persons’
and not just to one person, that is, the act of two or more persons (jointly).60
Emmett JA concluded, correctly so in my view: ‘There is no reason why
[the] purpose [of the proportionate liability provisions] should not extend to
wrongdoers who jointly commit a single act [or who all contribute to a single
54 Even though the vendors’ responsibility for the representations arose vicariously as a result
of the acts of the agent (ibid 358 [78]), the plaintiffs did not further prosecute their
proceedings against the agent, due to it being in liquidation. See also Pisano v Dandris
(2014) 17 BPR 33,583.
55 It should also be noted that the vendors did not seek to limit their liability based on the
responsibility of the agent, but only on the basis of their respective concurrent wrongdoing
inter se. The trial judge had rejected the proportionate liability defence, and held the two
vendors to be equally responsible for the misleading conduct and therefore 100 per cent of
the loss suffered as a result. See Pisano v Dandris (2014) 17 BPR 33,583. In the NSW Court
of Appeal, Bathurst CJ and McColl JA concurred in allowing the appeal that no liability
arose and that, further, even if so liable, was not subject to proportionate liability because a
separate claim under ACL s 30 would have been made out. However, their honours did not
concur in the part of Emmett JA’s judgment that considered the issue here under discussion,
preferring to leave the question of the meaning of concurrent wrongdoer open. More
recently, Buchanan J in Ambergate Ltd v CMA Corporation Ltd (2016) 110 ACSR 642, 686
[271] endorsed Emmett JA’s approach.
56 Williams (2015) 90 NSWLR 342, 355 [67].
57 The responsibility of each for the representations arose vicariously from the acts of the
agent: ibid 358, [78]).
58 Tomasetti v Brailey (2012) 274 FLR 248.
59 Hadgelias Holdings Pty Ltd v Seirlis [2015] 1 Qd R 337.
60 The word ‘whose’ in the definition, on Emmett JA’s analysis, therefore qualifies ‘2 or more
persons’ rather than just the ‘one’ person, a conclusion that must surely be correct to avoid
a strained interpretation. See Williams (2015) 90 NSWLR 342, 355–6 [69]–[70].
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act]61 that causes loss claimed by the plaintiff.’62
Therefore, on Emmett JA’s construction of s 87CB of the Consumer Act,
joint tortfeasors and joint wrongdoers, whether so as a result of their
relationship (for example, as a vicariously liable employer and employee, or
as multiple jointly vicariously liable employers), or the involvement of one in
another’s wrong (as an accessory), or because each contributed to the one act
or acts, or held a joint duty, would all potentially be concurrent wrongdoers.
Emmett JA therefore rejected the reasoning in Hadgelias that a vicariously
liable party is not a concurrent wrongdoer, but accepted that the outcome of
the case was correct, since specific sections in any case exempt vicarious
liability employers from relying on the proportionate liability regime by
asserting that their employees were concurrent wrongdoers.63 However, in the
case before him, those exemptions did not apply: the two vendors were both
jointly vicariously responsible for the same misleading conduct (of their
agent).
There are, therefore, two different interpretations of ‘concurrent
wrongdoer’ and those differences are critical in deciding cases. Although the
courts in both Tomasetti and Hadgelias rejected the interpretation later
adopted by Emmett JA, they did so with little analysis of the definition of
‘concurrent wrongdoer’ and usually in circumstances where proportionate
liability would in any case then have been precluded for other reasons. As long
as those differences in interpretation remain unresolved, the correct
adjudication of the problem in Scenario 2 remains uncertain. In my view,
Emmett JA’s interpretation is to be preferred. Having said that, however,
irrespective of the correct resolution of the problem in other jurisdictions, the
position may differ in Queensland and South Australia.
61 Ibid 360 [85].
62 Ibid 359 [81]. In light of Selig (2015) 255 CLR 661 which was decided after Williams,
Emmett JA would have needed to reject apportionment in any case since the plaintiffs had
also established a contravention of ACL s 30. Emmett JA went on to reject the possibility
that concurrent wrongdoers could each be held 100 per cent responsible. Instead he held that
their total responsibility combined cannot exceed 100 per cent: ibid 360–2 [86]–[93]). That
conclusion must be correct, although the reasoning in Tomasetti (2012) 274 FLR 248 [152]
could on one interpretation be supporting the opposite approach, as was also noted in
Hadgelias [2015] 1 Qd R 337, 343 [19] (not apparent in Tomasetti (2012) 274 FLR 248
whether reasoning concerned meaning of concurrent wrongdoer or apportionment).
63 Emmett JA in Williams (2015) 90 NSWLR 342, 357–8 [76] noted that the relevant
protective section under the Consumer Act s 87CI, was not referred to by the Queensland
Court of Appeal in Hadgelias [2015] 1 Qd R 337. That section, according to Emmett JA,
means that there is no need for apportionment of liability between principal and agent (and
employer and employee) in situations of vicarious liability. This conclusion must be correct,
though note the discussion below that the language of the relevant sections is poorly drafted
to achieve this. Importantly, vicarious liability was the context in which the question of
parties being jointly responsible for the same act or acts had arisen in Hadgelias, but this
was not the issue that arose in Williams. It should also be noted that if a claim were brought
in Queensland under the Fair Trading Act for contravention of the ACL, and not under
Commonwealth jurisdiction, then the proportionate liability governing provisions (found in
the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld)) are differently drafted and support the exclusion of joint
wrongdoers who are liable for a single act: see below.
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Queensland and South Australia are different
In Queensland and South Australia, the conclusion that parties who are jointly
responsible for a single act are not concurrent wrongdoers may be correct.
This is because of the absence of the word ‘or jointly’ in the definition of
‘concurrent wrongdoer’, which must surely have been intended to exclude all
circumstances where one party is ‘jointly’ liable with another. In other words,
only (distinct) acts (or omissions) that cause loss independently are caught.
That interpretation is supported by the case of Hobbs Haulage Pty Ltd
v Zupps Southside Pty Ltd.64 In Hobbs, the issue was whether the liability for
breach of contract of a contractor who had contracted with the plaintiff, was
concurrent with the subcontractor who had performed the work, allegedly
negligently. The Court found that it was not. In part, the Court simply accepted
the reasoning in Tomasetti65 and the trial judgment in Hadgelias.66 However,
the Court gave further reasons specifically by reference to the Queensland Act
and held that since the loss was caused by one and the same conduct, each
party being responsible for that single conduct, the parties were not persons
whose acts ‘independently of each other’ caused the loss that was the subject
of the claim.67 That conclusion is justifiable in Queensland, given the absence
of the words ‘or jointly’. It also seemingly applies beyond the factual context
of the case, so that all types of joint tortfeasors would not be covered by the
Queensland or South Australian provisions. If the facts of Tomasetti and
Hadgelias were therefore subject to adjudication under the Queensland or
South Australian civil liability statutes, then proportionate liability would not
apply for that reason, among others that have already been noted, including
vicarious liability, to which we now return.
Exemptions for vicarious liability
To summarise thus far: joint wrongdoers who are jointly responsible for a
single act or omission that is the subject of a claim are concurrent wrongdoers,
at least on the better view as to the construction of that term (and at least
outside of Queensland and South Australian jurisdiction). If this is accepted,
then an employer is a concurrent wrongdoer with the employee for whose
wrong it is vicariously liable. However, this does not mean that proportionate
liability applies to the employer in these circumstances. This is because of
specific provisions contained in the various proportionate liability regimes.
The wording of Consumer Act s 87CI, which is representative, is as follows:
Nothing in this Part:
(a) prevents a person being held vicariously liable for a proportion of an
apportionable claim for which another person is liable; or
(b) prevents a partner from being held severally liable with another partner for
that proportion of an apportionable claim for which the other partner is
liable; or
64 [2013] QSC 319 (18 November 2013).
65 Tomasetti v Brailey (2012) 274 FLR 248.
66 Seirlis v Bengston [2013] QSC 240 (11 September 2013), which was endorsed in Hadgelias
[2015] 1 Qd R 337.
67 Hobbs [2013] QSC 319 (18 November 2013) [26]–[27].
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(c) affects the operation of any other Act to the extent that it imposes several
liability on any person in respect of what would otherwise be an
apportionable claim.68
Certainly, it is generally assumed that proportionate liability was not
intended to apply to employers and principals who are vicariously liable for
their employees’ or agents’ wrongs.69 Section 87CI (and its equivalents) may
well give effect to that intention. That position, however, is not as clear cut as
it should be.
Section 87CI clearly does encompass the situation where conduct of an
employee, E, causes loss, alongside the concurrent wrong of another
defendant, D2. In that case, the employer of E, D1, would be vicariously liable
for the (presumably full) proportion of the loss apportioned to E’s conduct.
But what if there are only two relevant wrongdoers, an employee and the
vicariously liable employer? If the employer pleads the proportionate liability
defence, how does the section operate in that scenario? Could it be said that
the employer is vicariously liable for the proportion of the loss for which E is
liable? Is the effect of para (a) that employer is liable for its own (let us say
50 per cent) responsibility, and then vicariously liable for E’s (50 per cent) as
well? That must surely be the only appropriate conclusion.
Although that seems the likely effect of the section, it is odd that in
Tomasetti70 and Hadgelias71 the courts did not rely on the relevant exemptions
and conclude that proportionate liability has no role where a defendant is
vicariously liable for the acts of its employee/agent.
In Scenario 1, therefore, proportionate liability does not apply and the
employer defendant would not be entitled to limit its liability. This is because
of the operation of the specific exemptions. The same would apply to
principals (liable for their agents) and partners.72
Although this seems a sensible conclusion, there are further possible
complications. Let us consider the situations where a plaintiff seeks to hold a
defendant liable by reliance on provisions of the Consumer Act (s 139B/84(2)
or s 139C/84(4)) that deem a defendant to be liable for certain acts of agents
and employees. Under these sections, a defendant is deemed to be liable
directly, as a principal wrongdoer. How would proportionate liability apply
here?73 Do the exemptions for ‘vicarious liability’ apply, since that concept
68 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 87CI; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT)
s 107K; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 39; Proportionate Liability Act 2005 (NT) s 14;
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ss 32D, 32F; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and
Apportionment of Liability Act 2001 (SA) s 9; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 43G; Wrongs
Act 1958 (Vic) s 24AP; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5AO. The Queensland section has
a further para (d) which allows for exemplary damages.
69 See Davis Report, above n 17, 41; Williams (2015) 90 NSWLR 342, 359 [80], 359–60 [84].
70 Tomasetti v Brailey (2012) 274 FLR 248.
71 Seirlis v Bengston [2013] QSC 240 (11 September 2013), which was endorsed in Hadgelias
[2015] 1 Qd R 337.
72 It is unclear how these provisions would operate in those rare circumstances in which a
plaintiff brought action against the employee.
73 In Williams (2015) 90 NSWLR 342, 358–9 [79], Emmett JA assumes that there is no
difference between whether a company is vicariously liable for a director’s misleading
conduct, or is directly liable on the basis that the conduct was that of the company itself, for
the purposes of determining whether two persons are concurrent wrongdoers, since on either
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largely overlaps with the circumstances in which deeming apply? Such
questions remain unresolved, but they are not merely academic, given that the
precise basis for a claim and how it is pleaded can make a difference in this
context.74
Scenarios 2 and 3
Let us return to the remaining scenarios set out above. In Scenario 2 ‘joint
wrongdoers’, if Emmett JA is right, the parties are jointly responsible for the
single wrongful act and are caught by the proportionate liability regimes. This
seems consistent with the purpose of proportionate liability, namely to transfer
the risk of insolvency etc of one wrongdoer, onto plaintiffs. For example, if D
is assisted by an accessory A in committing a wrong, or if D1 and D2 jointly
engage in the same conduct, each would be only proportionately liable for
their respective share of the loss. The exceptions to this are Queensland and
South Australia, it would seem. In those jurisdictions, each defendant would
probably be fully liable.
In Scenario 3, the parties are clearly concurrent wrongdoers and this
conclusion follows irrespective of the disputed interpretation of that term. In
Scenario 3, therefore, proportionate liability applies, with one jurisdictional
exception, to which we now turn.
Postscript: Queensland really is different
In Hadgelias,75 the trial judge and the Court of Appeal dealt with the situation
where the real estate agent, Waight, had made a separate and distinct
misrepresentation for which the corporate agent and vendors were not
responsible. Waight was therefore a concurrent wrongdoer with respect to that
conduct; that is, there were two distinct acts, of distinct parties, that were
misleading. One would have thought, therefore, that Waight would be able to
claim apportionment of liability on the basis of that distinct wrong. However,
uniquely among the Australian jurisdictions, the following provision of the
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) applies in Queensland.
32F What if a concurrent wrongdoer is proved to have engaged in misleading
or deceptive conduct under the Fair Trading Act
Despite sections 31 and 32A, a concurrent wrongdoer in a proceeding in relation to
an apportionable claim who contravenes the Australian Consumer Law
(Queensland), section 18 is severally liable for the damages awarded against any
other concurrent wrongdoer to the apportionable claim.
basis, director and company would be jointly liable. I would agree; however, if a plaintiff
pleaded only that the director’s acts were deemed to be that of the company, which was
therefore liable as principal, would the provisions excluding a vicariously liable defendant
from the defence and thereby resulting in 100 per cent liability, apply?
74 See Selig (2015) 255 CLR 661, discussed above. In Hadgelios [2015] 1 Qd R 337 the
corporate vendor and the corporate agent were in fact directly liable as principal wrongdoers
because of deeming provisions, ss 139B, 139C of the Consumer Act. In that case, the
plaintiffs could easily have also pleaded vicarious liability of the parties (for their
employees’ or agents’ wrongs), instead of relying on ss 139B, 139C. Would it make a
difference which course was adopted if proportionate liability had been a live issue?
75 Seirlis v Bengston [2013] QSC 240 (11 September 2013); Hadgelias [2015] 1 Qd R 337.
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This section is bizarre, to say the least. It seemingly undermines the whole
purpose of the proportionate liability provisions. Section 28 of the Civil
Liability Act 2003 (Qld) expressly includes breaches of s 18 ACL as
apportionable claims. If D1 and D2 each engage in separate acts of misleading
conduct, and D1 pleads proportionate liability, D1 and D2 will both be
precluded from relying on the defence as a result of this section, even after
they have successfully jumped through the hoops of establishing an
‘apportionable claim’ and that they are ‘concurrent wrongdoers’. This is the
conclusion that McMurdo J reached at trial, upheld in the Court of Appeal in
Hadgelias. In neither judgment was there any analysis of the issue, nor did
either court note the seeming absurdity of the provision.
Importantly, s 32F means that defendants who are natural persons and are
only liable under the Queensland Fair Trading Act are in a worse positon than
corporations that are subject to the proportionate liability rules of the
Commonwealth Consumer Act!76
Conclusion
It remains to briefly summarise what the analysis above has shown.
(1) Where a loss arises from an apportionable claim, parties that are
jointly liable for a single act are concurrent wrongdoers, at least on
the interpretation that is most persuasive, and the one which will
most likely prevail.77 Jurisdiction matters, however, and this is not
so, probably, in Queensland and South Australia.
(2) However, vicariously liable joint wrongdoers — even if they are
‘concurrent wrongdoers’ — cannot take advantage of proportionate
liability because specific provisions exclude that possibility, or so it
would seem.
(3) It is definitely in plaintiffs’ interests to plead contraventions of more
specific misleading conduct provisions, or different claims altogether,
even if alongside ACL s 18 claim, in order to circumvent possible
proportionate liability defences by defendants (Selig).
(4) Jurisdiction matters, again: Any claim in Queensland for breach of
the Fair Trading Act is not subject to apportionment at all (Civil
Liability Act 2003 s 32F), contrary to the very definition of
apportionable claim in s 28, and as strange as that may seem.
76 McMurdo J in Seirlis v Bengston [2013] QSC 240 (11 September 2013) did not clearly
explain whether this section also potentially applied to the other defendants (at [121]) (who,
in any case, were not proportionately liable for other reasons). However, he concluded that
none could reduce their liability: at [122].
77 See Ambergate Ltd v CMA Corporation Ltd (2016) 110 ACSR 642, 686 [271].
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